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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001745

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: POLITICALLY-INEPT RUBERWA PLAYS CARDS BADLY

REF: KINSHASA 1657

Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D

¶1. (C) Summary. On September 10, VP Azarias Ruberwa met with a CIAT delegation and complained about the CIAT's ineffectiveness, the state of army integration, security sector reform, and hate media. It is unclear how committed Ruberwa and his followers will be to the transition if their key demands cannot be met. End summary.

¶2. (C) Since the RCD/G's return on September 1, the Supreme Defense Council has met twice. National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo told DCM and polcouns on September 10 that the council would discuss military integration, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and what he calls 'military missions' and what Ruberwa calls 'parallel military structures.' On September 6-8, the Council of Ministers discussed Ruberwa's evaluation of the transition.

RCD/G Hard-liners Meet with CIAT

¶3. (C) MONUC Poloff told poloff that on September 10 an abbreviated CIAT group (South Africa, Belgium, UK, Netherlands in its capacity as EU President, Angola and African Union) met with Ruberwa (in his capacity as RCD/G President) and a group of RCD/G hard-liners who all went to Goma during the recent transition standoff. The two-hour meeting took place at Ruberwa's residence. For 1 1/2 hours, Ruberwa went through the standard litany of RCD/G complaints. He complained extensively about the CIAT's ineffectiveness, said the CIAT was partly to blame for past problems with the transition and would be responsible for future possible problems if it did not take a more active role--perhaps as an arbitrator of disputes. He also complained that the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), at the local level, would be staffed by PPRD faithful because the CIAT failed to support earlier RCD/G calls for representation for all components at all levels of the electoral process. (Comment: Earlier this year, we and other CIAT members lobbied hard to prevent precisely what Ruberwa is proposing, because it would have politicized the CEI and rendered it unwieldy. End comment.)

¶4. (C) Ruberwa also complained about parallel military structures, nonexistent progress on army integration, security sector reform and hate media (septel). He said that there was very little money in the budget for general military expenditures, and no money in the current budget for army integration. (Comment: These two points are valid. Most military spending is decided by the 'Maison Militaire'--an advisory structure within the Presidency. End comment). Ruberwa said there has been no progress on security sector reform, citing as an example the fact that the ANR (the main intelligence agency) has never submitted a single report to him. Finally, Ruberwa loudly complained about the climate of hate media which he claims is being supported directly by those close to the President. (Comment: This serious allegation has some merit. On September 9, moderate Vice Minister of Interior, Paul Musafiri (MLC) told polcouns that for \$100, anyone could go on television and say anything they wanted. He suggested that PPRD members had provided money to certain individuals, including Pastor Ngoy, to deliver anti-Banyamulenge messages. End comment.)

Comment

¶5. (C) CIAT colleagues present told the Ambassador that it was a fatiguing exercise. Present with Ruberwa in the room were a variety of RCD/G leaders, most known as relative hard-liners. None of the non-Tutsi RCD/G Ministers who refused to accompany Ruberwa to Goma recently nor associate themselves with the RCD/G decision to 'suspend' participation in the transition were present. Subsequent discussion in the CIAT indicated that the CIAT will not make any formal response to the many RCD/G points, but rather indicate that the CIAT is actively engaged in addressing problems and issues that threaten continued progress in the transition, or violate principles and provisions of the underlying peace accords.

¶6. (C) Though some of his complaints are valid, Ruberwa has played his cards badly. Although intelligent, Ruberwa often seems politically blind and has consistently managed to

present himself as a defender of the Banyamulenge and Rwandans first, and of the Congolese second. His often emotional reaction to nationality issues seems to have played into the hands of extremists (like Bizima Karaha and Moise Nyarugabo) within his party, and has probably strengthened the hand of PPRD and MLC hard-liners, making compromise on key questions such as amnesty and nationality laws that much more difficult. Pro-government press, most notably the daily L'Avenir and the digitalcongo.net website, have had a field day-- a veritable Ruberwa-roast over the past several days.

17. (C) As the political space for moderate, reasoned debate continues to erode, the possibility for political stalemate or, worse, conflict, grows larger. In response, the CIAT will likely play a more active role, privately and publicly. There is still political will to reach the elections (partly because no one party or individual wishes to be identified as the spoiler, and we believe that this commonality of interests between the international community and the Congolese political class, together with progress on some of the RCD/G's more reasonable demands, will enable the transition to recapture momentum. End comment.

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